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The "Affected" Post-Preimplantation 
Genetic Diagnosis Embryo1 
Estair Van Wagner, Roxanne Mykitiuk & Jeff Nisker 
Introduction 
The meaning of "health" is constructed from a variety of 
perspectives, including biomedical, social and political, and in a 
variety of sites, including human bodies and natural environ-
ments. In this chapter we suggest that the human embryo is one 
such site. At first glance the in vitro embryo is not an obvious 
location from which to examine such constructions; however, 
we contend that an increasing focus on biomedical determi-
nations of the "health" of the human embryo (Mykitiuk and· 
Nisker, 2008b; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008) is 
significant not only in the application to human embryos them-
selves, but also in terms of our broader understanding of 
"health" in relation to existing adults and children. 
New technologies and research initiatives are shaping the 
way in which we look at the embryo and what we look for 
(Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008b; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and 
Nisker, 2008). Conventionally, the term "embryo" denotes the 
product of fertilisation of a human oocyte by a human sperm 
generally until eight weeks' development (Warnock, 1984). 
Numerous groups and individuals have attempted to charac-
terise and describe the human embryo from perspectives such as 
1 The authors are grateful to the CIHR Institute of Child and Youth 
Health and Human Development for funding this research. 
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ethics, religion, science or medicine, in relation to the objectives 
and interests of their respective communities (Mykitiuk and 
Nisker, 2008b; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). In Aus-
tralia, the legal definition2 of "human embryo" is "a compromise 
between different views and resulted from the legal imperative 
to have a defined point against which legal judgments could be 
made" (Australian Government, 2005: 173). Heightened interest 
in defining and characterising the human embryo has resulted 
from the creation and manipulation of embryos outside of 
women's bodies, particularly through research related to assis-
ted reproduction (Blake, Proctor, Johnson et al, 2002; Steptoe and 
Edwards, 1978; Yuzpe, Brown, Casper et al, 1989) and genetic 
testing (Handyside, Kontogianni, Hardy et al, 1990; Verlinsky, 
Lifchez, Valle et al, 1990; Verlinsky, Handyside, Simpson et al, 
1993; Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008b; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and 
Nisker, 2008). 
The characterisation of human embryos affects the ways 
embryos may be used, by women undergoing in vitro ferti-
lisation (IVF), or by clinicians and scientists (Mykitiuk and 
Nisker, 2008b; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). For ins- \ 
tance, researchers and clinicians have emphasised selection of. 
the ''best'' or "most suitable" embryo for implantation to achieve 
the highest pregnancy rate while removing the risk of high order 
multiple pregnancy (Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008a; Min, Claman 
and Hughes, 2006). As assisted reproductive technology (ART) 
increasingly employs genetics-based techniques such as pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis (PGO), new characterisations of 
the human embryo will emerge based on the new information 
made available (Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008b; Van Wagner, 
Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). PGO facilitates the selection of 
embryos created by IVF for transfer to the woman based on the 
particular criteria being tested such as the presence of genetic 
2 This statement was made in relation to the definition of "human 
embryo" in the Research Involving Human Embryos Act 2002 (Cth), 
which has since been amended by the Prohibition of Human Cloning for 
Reproduction and the Regulation of Human Embryo Research Amendment 
Ad 2006 (Cth), Sch 2 (2). The point about the dependency of the legal 
definition of the human embryo on different contexts remains relevant, 
and perhaps is even reinforced by the context in which these changes 
were made (see the discussion in Australia's Lockhart Review (Aus-
tralian Senate Committee on Community Affairs, 2006)). 
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markers for diseases (Handyside, Kontogianni, Hardy et al, 1990; 
Nisker and Gore-Langton, 1995) or a compatible tissue match 
for an existing sick sibling (Verlinsky, Rechitsky, Schoolcraft et 
al, 2001). Further, as new research initiatives such as stem 
cell research develop, policy-makers may characterise human 
embryos in such a manner as to promote research (Mykitiuk and 
Nisker, 2008b; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). The 
purpose of this chapter is to examine the language employed 
in recent policy statements and regulatory documents to 
characterise the "affected" post-PGD embryo and to discuss the 
interdependent relationship between how embryos are char-
acterised and the uses and purposes which PGD serves. ln this 
examination we illustrate how understandings of "health" 
are produced through the research uses and clinical practice of 
PGD (Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008b; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and 
Nisker, 2008). 
Background, Methods and Characterisations 
Before embryo cryopreservation (Trounson and Mohr, 1983), 
determinations of embryo "health" were based on morphologic 
criteria, in other words, by looking at the embryo through a 
microscope. Clinicians would look for features such as cell 
division, absence of fragmentation, and blastomere symmetry 
and clarity. These observations led to the selection of the "best" 
three or more embryos, which were transferred into the woman, 
the remaining embryos being discarded (Mykitiuk and Nisker, 
2008b; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). Within the past 
15 years, embryos not selected for transfer have been cryopre-
served for later transfer so that the woman could avoid the risks 
associated with menotropin drugs (Abramov, Ekhalal and 
Schenker, 1999) and oocyte retrieval surgeries (Alsalili, Yuzpe, 
Tummon et al, 1995), either of which may be employed in 
additional IVF cycles (Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008b; Van Wagner, 
Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). At some IVF clinics today, 
clinicians and scientists still use microscopic criteria to deter-
mine which embryos are the "healthiest-looking", and transfer 
the "best" embryos while "fresh", in order to achieve the 
highest pregnancy rate (Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008b; Van Wag-
ner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). In fact there is no evidence that 
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an embryo's potential to become a child can be conclusively 
determined using morphologic characteristics viewable through 
a microscope. There is in fact evidence to the contrary (Tek-
petey, Hughes, Shepherd et al, 2003). 
The number of gene markers identified through PGD is 
rapidly expanding and provides another context in which deter-
minations of the "best" or "healthy" embryo are being made 
(Lau and Leung, 2005). Such biomedical characteristics may be 
used to prevent the birth of a child who may suffer from a parti-
cular perceived "health" problem, or to positively select charac-
teristics of a potential child (Levy, 2002; Mykitiuk and Nisker, 
2008b; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). The focus of 
this chapter is on the "post-PGD embryo" - those embryos that 
have been tested using PGD. As our analysis demonstrates, the 
genetic information available through PGD and the intention 
behind diagnosis lead to several possible categorisations of the 
post-PGD embryo (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). 
Our research focuses on four jurisdictions: the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. We consider 
legislative, policy, scientific and research documents relating to 
PGD. These documents construct the regulation of PGD as part 
of the governance of ART - the use of in vitro human embryos. In 
the jurisdictions examined here, PGD is governed by "faci-
litative" legislative regimes, which establish "broad legislative 
frameworks" (Human Genome Research Project (HGRP), 2006: 
302) in which decision-making powers are delegated to statutory 
and/or professional bodies. We argue that the documents exami-
ned here serve an important, but under-examined function in 
shaping the clinical practice and scientific application of PGD. 
Our examination will analyse the precise language through 
which characterisations of the post-PGD embryo occur. Further, 
we explore how resulting use or non-use of post-PGD embryos 
relate to understandings of "health" in the context of ART and 
embryo research (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). 
Five possible characterisations of the post-PGD embryo 
emerge from our analysis. These characterisations include: 1) 
affected; 2) unaffected; 3) carrier; 4) sex-selected; and 5) HLA 
tissue-typed (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). The 
focus of this chapter is on the affected post-PGD embryo and 
how this determination is made in relation to what is considered 
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an unaffected post-PGD embryo.3 These characterisations are 
not mutually exclusive as the post-PGD embryo may exist with-
in multiple categories at once, or change from one to another 
depending on the uses to which it may or may not be put. 
The Unaffected Embryo 
PGD enables clinicians to identify embryos as "affected" or "un-
affected", allowing women undergoing IVF treatment to choose 
"embryos that are predicted to be unaffected" (HGC, 2006: 44) 
for implantation. This selection "provides an opportunity to 
begin a pregnancy knowing that only unaffected embryos have 
been transferred" (HFEA and ACGT, 2000: 8). The unaffected 
embryo is said to be "suitable" to be transferred or implanted in 
light of its status as "disease-free" (CBS, 2005a: 2), "without" 
(HGC, 2004: 10), or "free" (NECAHR, 2004: 3) of a genetic dis-
order or "chromosomal abnormality" (HGC, 2004: 18), not 
having "a copy of the faulty gene" (HFEA, 2005: 7), "not car-
ry[ing] markers for the condition in question" (HCARO, 2005: 1), 
"not known to have such an abnormality" (HFE Bill: s 14(4)(9)) 
or "not hav[ing] the particular gene mutation" (CBS, 2005a: 4). 
After PGD is completed there may be more embryos than 
are required for immediate transfer. Current practice in some 
jurisdictions (ACART, 2006: 12; HGRP, 2006: 47, 52) is to keep 
the number of embryos transferred to a minimum. As PGD 
necessarily involves the creation of embryos for genetic analysis 
(CBS, 2005a: 4), one of its more controversial aspects is what 
happens to the embryos created which are not transferred to the 
woman. As with all IVF embryos, post-PGD "remaining" (CBS, 
2005a: 5), "supernumerary" (CBS, 2005b: 2), "spare" (STC, 2005: 
23; HGRP, 2006: 47), "surplus" (ACART, 2006: 13; HGRP, 2006: 
47) or "excess" (Research Involving Human Embryos Act 2002 (Cth) 
(RIHE Act) s 7(1)) embryos are those "no longer required" 
(Australian Government, 2005: 7) for the reproductive purposes 
for which they were created. The manner in which embryos are 
classified as one of the five characterisations differs across juris-
dictions, as do the ways in which they may be used for 
3 The authors explore all five themes in more detail elsewhere see Van 
Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008. 
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reproductive or research purposes.4 Unaffected embryos "remai-
ning" (CBS, 2005a: 33), could be "destroyed" (CBS, 2005a, 2005b; 
HGRP, 2006: 163), stored (STC, 2005: 23; HFEA, 2005: 7; HFE 
Bill: s 15(2)(b)(ab)),5 "used for research purposes" (HGRP, 2006: 
163) or donated to "another individual" (STC, 2005: 23) for "rep-
roductive purposes" (CBS, 2005b: 33; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk 
and Nisker, 2008). 
While policy documents and legislation do not use "healthy" 
as a general descriptor of the unaffected embryo, they have used 
the term in discussions about the disposition of embryos not to 
be used for reproductive purposes, either because there are addi-
tional unaffected embryos, which are not needed for implanta-
tion, or because PGD is being employed to select a tissue-match 
or avoid a carrier embryo (HGC, 2006: 14, 51, 52; HGRP, 2006: 21, 
43; NHMRC, 2007b: 42). These situations are framed as creating 
an ethical dilemma with respect to the disposal or use of 
"healthy", or unaffected embryos, which implies that the dis-
posal or use of an affected post-PGD embryo does not pose the 
same ethical issues (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). 
We contend that an assessment or characterisation of 
"health" based on the outcome of PGD is problematic because 
only specific, limited genetic markers are identified, and there-
fore, "health" is understood as the absence of these markers and 
the medical conditions they are associated with in living persons 
(Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). "PGD is not a gua-
rantee of a healthy baby" (HGRP, 2006: 17, 52), and as the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) in the 
UK has indicated, through the use of PGD, "the woman makes a 
decision about suitability based on information about the 
genetic status of the embryo" (2005: 9), which is only one of 
many factors in the overall health of a child. 
The Affected Embryo 
An embryo will be considered "affected" if the presence of a 
genetic "anomaly" (CBS, 2005a: 1), "mutation" (HGRP, 2006: 1) 
4 For a more detailed account see Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 
2008. 
5 This section pertains to the storage of embryos generally. 
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or an "abnormality" (Australian Government, 2005: 120; HFE 
Bill: s 14(4)(9), Sch 2.5.3 para IZA) has been detected through 
PGD. Under the current practice of PGD, such information is 
used to identify embryos affected by "serious, life threatening 
conditions" (HGRP, 2006: 5), "a genetic disease" (ACART, 2006: 
13), a "serious genetic disorder" (HGC, 2004), "serious genetic 
defects" (Australian Government, 2005), "genetic abnormality or 
disease" (ITA, 2006b), "serious genetic abnormality or a disease" 
(Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (WA) s 14(2b)(a)(ii)) or 
"genetic conditions incompatible with life, or with a life of 
quality" (STC, 2005: 28). In the jurisdictions we examined, PGD 
is currently applied to diagnose X-linked conditions, "numerical 
chromosomal abnormalities" (CBS, 2005a: 4; HGRP, 2006: 3, 37; 
NECAHR, 2004: 4), specific gene mutations or "single-gene 
defects" (NECAHR, 2004: 4). 
Defining "serious" 
The term "serious" is invoked in a number of jurisdictions as a 
threshold between current and acceptable uses of PGD and 
those characterised as "trivial or [for] social reasons" (HGC, 
2004: 19; HGRP, 2006: 46; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 
2008). Despite widespread use of the term in this way, there is 
no common or specific definition of "serious" in any of the four 
jurisdictions we examined (HCARO, 2005; HGC, 2004: 22; 
HGRP, 2006: 236; NECAHR, 2004: 9; NHMRC, 2007b: 42). 
The HFEA' s Code of Practice states that PGD will be offered 
"only where there is a significant risk of a serious genetic 
condition being present in the embryo" (HFEA, 2003: 123). The 
HFE Bill, being reviewed by Committee as of May 2008 would 
amend the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK) 
to restrict "embryo testing" for "gene, chromosome or mito-
chondrial abnormality" and sex-linked conditions (HFE Bill: 
s 14(4)(9), s 14(4)(10)) to cases where "there is a significant risk 
that a person with the abnormality will have or develop a 
serious physical or mental disability, a serious illness or any 
other serious medical condition" (Bill Sch 2.5.3 para lZA(l)(a), 
(2)). In a 2005 report on the application of PGD for "lower pene-
trance susceptibility conditions", the HFEA stated, "(h]ow 
serious a condition is depends on how having the condition 
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affects, threatens or limits the life of the individual" (2005: 11). 
According to the report, a condition that will not "cause some-
one to suffer or detrimentally affect their life" would be 
"unlikely to be regarded as serious", while a condition that 
requires "regular invasive treatment, or was life-limiting or life 
threatening" would be (HFEA, 2005: 11). The HFEA has since 
announced a policy approving the use of PGD to detect the 
BRCA 1, BRCA 2, and HNPCC genes.6 This change arguably 
opened up a wider application of PGD than that allowed by the 
previous HFEA position, which had largely limited the practice 
to detection of high penetrance7 and early onset conditions 
(Krahn, 2007: 1445; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). 
The HFEA does not provide a definition for "serious", 
instead leaving it to "discussion between the people seeking 
treatment and the clinical team" (HFEA, 2003: 123). It provides 
no formal list of "serious" conditions for which PGD is permit-
ted, but in practice, because of its licensing procedure, particular 
PGD applications form an "accepted list of conditions" (STC, 
2005). The Code of Practice outlines factors to be considered in 
determining when PGD is appropriate, including the pers-
pective of the woman, or couple, the family situation, as well as 
the nature of the specific condition in question (HFEA, 2003: 
123). While the original Draft Bill would have amended the 
HFEA Act to require the consideration of five factors in deter-
mining whether embryo testing is "necessary or desirable", 
neither the woman's nor her partner's perspective, nor their 
family circumstances were included (2007: s 59 Sch 2 para 
1ZA(3)). This provision was not included in the HFE Bill now 
under consideration by Parliament. 
In Australia the regulation of PGD falls under State jurisdic-
tion; however, several States employ the Commonwealth regu-
latory regime on embryo research governed by the NHMRC's 
6 See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, "HFEA - Autho-
rity decision on PGD policy", available at <www.hfea.gov.uk/cps/ 
rde/xchg/SID-3F57D79B-FDBD411B/hfea/hs.xsV1124.html> (last acces-
sed 28 May 2007). 
7 The penetrance of BRCA mutations in the Ashkenazi Jewish com-
munity is very high. It is almost 80 per cent (Struewing, Abeliovich, 
Peretz et al, 1995; Tonin, Mes-Masson, Futreal et al, 1995; Wamer, 
Foulkes, Goodwin et al, 1999). 
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Ethical Guidelines. This regime restricts PGD to conditions that 
"seriously harm" (NHMRC, 2007b: para 12.2). Some States do 
have specific legislation pertaining to ART and PGD. Western 
Australia's Reproductive Technology Council (RTC) states that 
the "seriousness of a genetic disease should be considered in the 
broad context of the environmental and personal factors of the 
participants" (RTC, 2004: 3). Licence applications for PGD con-
tain the report of a "clinical geneticist" that addresses a number 
of factors including: the family's "experience with, and attitude 
to" the condition; the "level of impairment to body functions and 
structures that is usually associated"; the difficulties expected in 
"participating in activities such as learning and applying 
knowledge, communication, mobility, self-care, employment, 
community, social and civic life"; the "level of support" required 
and the "capacity of the family" to provide it; and the "prospects 
for new and longer term treatments and interventions for the 
condition" (RTC, 2004: 4-5; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 
2008). 
The PGD policy of the IT A in Victoria employs the criteria 
set out ins 8(3) of the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 that a "genetic 
abnormality or disease might be transmitted to a person born", 
but it does not define these terms (ITA, 2006b). The policy 
"entrusts" this determination to "the specialist with qualifi· 
cations in human genetics", explicitly placing the physician in 
the role of "gatekeeper" with respect to PGD (ITA, 2006b: [4.2]). 
The ITA's approach to the regulation of PGD includes using 
a schedule of "Approved Genetic Testing", which outlines "rou-
tine" uses that do not require notification of application 
(ITA, 2006a).8 The ITA also sets out uses that "require approval 
on a case by case basis", such as sex-linked conditions involving 
"inconclusive evidence about the transmission of that 
8 List A of the schedule to the Act discusses the "Use of PCD where 
women have already been admitted for treatment and where the pur· 
poses of PCD is to detect chromosomal imbalances in the cases: 
recurrent implantation failure; recurrent miscarriage; advanced mater· 
nal age; previous history of fetal aneuploidy; known carriers of 
chromosomal rearrangements". List B covers "Current use of PGD in 
Victoria where further notification to the Infertility Treatment Autho-
rity is not required": known carriers of chromosomal anomalies; deter-
mination of embryonic sex in certain specific conditions; and particular 
heritable single gene disorders. 
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condition", including Autism and Asperger's Syndrome (ITA, 
2006a: List C). Conditions not listed in the schedule would 
require "prospective notification" to the authority (IT A, 2006a: 
5). Approval for PGD in these circumstances requires fulfilment 
of the s 8(3) criteria as determined by a doctor specialising in 
genetics (ITA, 2006b: [6a] [6c]). 
In Canada, access to PGD "is currently controlled by the 
medical profession" (CBS, 200Sa: 2); however, "there are no 
Canadian standards or professional guidelines relating to the 
use of PGD in Canada" (HCARO, 2005: 6). Without formal regu-
lation, decisions concerning PGD are made privately by the 
woman, or couple, and the doctor (CBS, 2005a: 2). Health 
Canada's report on the regulation of PGD distinguishes use for 
"medical/health reasons" from use for "non-health related traits, 
such as hair or eye colour". They use the "serious condition" 
standard as a generally accepted limitation to PGD, but acknow-
ledge that seriousness would be "difficult to define" and that 
"there are many complex factors that need to be accounted for in 
this definition" (HCARO, 2005: 11; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and 
Nisker, 2008). 
New Zealand's PGD guidelines state that in order to 
perform PGD for "familial single gene", "familial sex-linked" 
(NECAHR, 2005: 5 s 2.4) and "familial chromosomal" disorders 
(NECAHR, 2005: 5), there should be "evidence that the future 
individual may be seriously impaired as a result of the disorder'' 
(NECAHR, 2005: ss 1.3, 2.4, 3.2). Seriousness is not defined, but 
the guidelines provide that "[i]t is the responsibility of PGD 
providers, in collaboration with a clinical geneticist, to determine 
whether a disorder is likely to be serious in the offspring" 
(NECAHR, 2005). In this situation, the woman and her family do 
not participate in the determination of "seriousness" (Van 
Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). 
One can critique the "seriousness" standard from a number 
of perspectives: 
Although PGD can confirm the presence of a genetic ano-
maly, it cannot predict the extent to which the in vitro 
embryo, if transferred into the womb and born alive, would 
be affected as a child or adult. (CBS, 2005a: 2) 
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This uncertainty becomes particularly problematic when 
PGD is used to diagnose "later onset" disorders such as Alzhei-
mer's or "low penetrant" conditions (HCARO, 2005: 11; HGRP, 
2006: 50). Further, understandings of what constitutes "suf-
fering", what one might consider "detrimental effects", or a "life 
limiting" or "threatening" condition, are subjective and depen-
dent on numerous factors relating to both the individuals and 
family involved, along with the particular condition at issue 
(HGRP, 2006: 37). The HFEA itself suggests that "these factors 
may be difficult to predict before the affected person is born" 
(2005: 11; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). 
Evidence suggests that: 
People with genetic disorders, their families and profes-
sionals have different views about which conditions give rise 
to a poor quality of life. In general, those who have a direct 
experience of living with a genetic disorder are likely to rate 
the quality of their lives more highly than would medically 
qualified professionals. (HGRP, 2006: 37) 
The approach of the HFEA and Western Australia of consi-
dering the perceptions of the people seeking IVF and PGD 
in defining "seriousness", illustrates the subjectivity of such a 
determination (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). While 
the STC legislative review dismissed the use of the word 
"eugenics" by its critics "as an emotive term of abuse to obscure 
rational debate" (STC, 2005: 55), concerns about who defines 
what a "serious" condition is, and on what basis, have not been 
adequately addressed by either law or policy in any of the 
jurisdictions examined. Rather than confronting the complexity 
of the shifting nature of determining "seriousness" and its 
consequences, we contend that current legal and policy 
approaches ignore subjective considerations in favour of 
"medical" or "scientific" criteria. This focus seems to imply that 
"seriousness" can be defined outside the context of the lives and 
experiences of those undergoing ART and PGD (Van Wagner, 
Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). 
The HGRP points out that in New Zealand, legislation and 
policy decisions have given professionals involved in PGD "a 
broad mandate to determine what constitutes a disorder that 
could cause serious impairment in a future child, and the likeli-
hood of it happening" (2006: 236). The HGRP distinguishes 
47 
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between the role of clinicians in determining the "likelihood of 
a disorder manifesting in prospective offspring", which they 
view as "generally unproblematic", and their role in stating 
"what constitutes a serious disorder" (HGRP, 2006: 236). This 
latter determination involves both "objective" considerations, 
including the age at which a disease emerges and the possibility 
of prevention and/or therapy, and "subjective" considerations, 
including the "experience of the prospective parents in relation 
to the condition" (HGRP, 2006: 236). Their report discusses the 
possibility that "by leaving such decisions in the hands of 
treating clinicians, rather than in those seeking the procedure, 
PGD cannot be represented as providing greater autonomy and 
reproductive freedom" (HGRP, 2006: 236). 
Basing decisions about PGD on a "discussion between the 
people seeking treatment and the clinical team" is presented as 
a way to balance "respecting the views of those seeking PGD" 
and "preventing the use of technology for purposes that are 
widely considered to be unacceptable" (HFEA, 2005: 12). While 
we support the primacy of a woman's role in determining what 
reproductive choices are best for her and her family, we caution 
that respect for reproductive autonomy should not be invoked 
to allow policy-makers and clinicians to avoid complex and 
difficult questions about the potential implications ot repro-
ductive and genetic technologies on conceptions of "health" and 
"normalcy" (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). Ques-
tions about how the use of technologies such as PGD may affect 
social norms and ideas about family and being human (HGC, 
2004: 20) or about how "reproductive choices are being made 
against a background of inadequate social support for, and 
widespread discrimination against, disabled people and people 
with genetic disorders" (HGC, 2004: 22 5.8) should not be 
obscured or limited to private discussions in the realm of the 
clinic (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). 
What happens to the affected emb1110? 
Upon being identified as "affected", the post-PGD embryo 
is constructed to be incompatible with reproduction. Charac-
terised as "unsuitable" (Australian Government, 2005: 169; STC, 
2005: 23) or "unfit" (Australian Government, 2005: 175), the 
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affected embryo is generally assumed to be "discarded" (Aus-
tralian Government, 2005: xvi; CBS, 2005a: 5, 7, 22; HFEA and 
ACCT, 2000: 8; HGRP, 2006: 7, 55, 320; NECAHR, 2004: 7), 
"allowed" (HFEA, 2005: 7) or "left" (CBS, 2005a) to perish, or 
that PGD will result in their "disposal" (HFEA and ACCT, 2000: 
8) or "destruction" (HCC, 2004: 45; HGRP, 2006: 163). As the 
recent legislative review in Australia found: 
Under current arrangements, embryos that are not suitable 
for implantation for any reason, including embryos that are 
found to have a genetic disease using preimplantation gene-
tic diagnosis, are allowed to die and are not available for 
research. (Australian Government, 2005: 168) 
However, recent debates in Australia suggest that the desig-
nation of "affected" embryo, may signal a shift in an embryo's 
purpose and/or value (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). 
On one hand, the value of an affected embryo for reproductive 
purposes is diminished, as it is assumed that the intention 
behind undergoing the diagnostic procedure is the avoidance of 
the transfer of an embryo affected by the genetic condition being 
tested for (Australian Government, 2005: 120; IT A, 2006b: {3]). 
On the other hand, however, the affected embryo becomes 
valuable in the context of research and training (Australian 
Government, 2005: xvi). Indeed, a recent ACART consultation 
on embryo research in New Zealand specifically discussed post-
PGD embryos as one source of surplus embryos for research 
purposes (ACART, 2006: 13). 
Just as for non-PGD embryos (Nisker and White, 2005), our 
research suggests that attempts to characterise post-PGD 
embryos may be driven by both the increasing demand for 
embryos for research purposes and ethical concerns about the 
use of human embryos (see discussions in Australian Govern-
ment, 2005; CBS, 2005a; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 
2008). ACART proposes using post-PGD embryos for research, 
as "they may never be transferred to a woman's uterus" 
(ACART, 2006: 13). The presumption that post-PGD affected 
embryos would otherwise be "discarded" (Australian Govern-
ment, 2005: xvi) featured prominently in the 2005 Australian 
legislative review. The RIHE Act has since undergone major 
amendments with respect to the availability of affected embryos 
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for research pursuant to the Prohibition of Human Cloning for 
Reproduction and the Regulation of Human Embryo Research Amend-
ment Act 2006 (Cth) (Patterson Act). A number of submissions 
made to the legislative review committee pointed to the lack of 
clarity in the RIHE Act on the status of post-PGD embryos 
deemed "unsuitable for implantation" (Australian Government, 
2005: xvi, 31, 38, 76, 169).9 Several parties10 argued that post-PGD 
affected embryos should not be considered simply as "excess" 
embryos subject to the same consent and donation process 
outlined in the "ART Guidelines" that applies to embryos crea-
ted by IVF, but which the couple no longer needs for 
reproduction (see NHMRC, 2004: (17.17]). Rather, parties argued 
that through policy and legal reforms to avoid their characteris-
ation as "excess", such post-PGD affected embryos could be 
made available as "fresh" embryos for research and training 
(Australian Government, 2005: 120). 
Submissions to the Review Committee consistently sugges-
ted that "fresh embryos" were "required" (Australian Govern-
ment, 2005: 37) and that "abnormally fertilised" and "unsui-
table" embryos "should be made available for research and trai-
ning" (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). The Committee 
recommended that post-PGD embryos "diagnosed . .. as being 
unsuitable for implantation should be permitted to be used 
under licence for research, training and improvements in clinical 
practice" (Australian Government, 2005: xvii). This recommen-
dation was specifically aimed at addressing the unavailability of 
"fresh" (Australian Government, 2005: 38) embryos resulting 
from the 14-day "cooling-off" (Australian Government, 2005: 37) 
period applied to donations of "excess" embryos following IVF 
(NECAHR, 2004: s 17.7), which would be frozen and stored for 
14 days before becoming available for research. The Committee 
relied on the assumption that affected embryos would "normally 
9 The review notes that the lack of clarity does not necessarily exist in 
the States that have independent legislation in place to govern ART 
and PGD (2005, 169). 
10 For the most part, parties made confidential submissions to the 
committee. Submissions made openly available include those made by: 
The Plunkett Centre for Ethics, Submission LRCSSO; Professor Martin 
Pera et al, Monash University, Submission LRC509 and Sydney IVF, 
Submission LRC 819. All are available online at <www.lockhart 
review.com.au/submissions.html> (last accessed 10 May 2007}. 
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be discarded" (Australian Government, 2005: 120), as they were 
deemed unsuitable for reproductive purposes, and therefore, 
that they need not be subject to "proper consent" procedures. 
Using post-PGD embryos as a source of "fresh" embryos for 
research raises concerns that determinations made by those prac-
ticing PGD will be influenced by the demand for research 
embryos. Increased comfort with production of embryos 
through IVF for research purposes may serve to justify the 
expansion of PGD' s application and to narrow the definition of a 
"suitable" or "unaffected" embryo in the interests of ensuring 
"fresh" embryos are available. In tum, our understanding of 
what kinds of conditions are compatible, or incompatible, with 
reproduction and health may be further shifted to exclude 
particular genetic characteristics (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and 
Nisker, 2008). 
Throughout the documents we surveyed, the presumption 
of selection against embryos affected by genetic conditions is 
widespread, despite ongoing debate about the implications 
of using PGD to make such determinations and the lack of 
transparency in deciding to which conditions PGD should be 
applied. Distinctions are being made between embryos to be 
used for reproduction and affected embryos based on proble-
matic assumptions about the use and purposes of reproductive 
technologies (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). The 
assumption that "reproductive use" inherently means selecting 
an embryo free of a particular genetic condition or abnormality 
(Australian Government, 2005: 120) subtly shifts the meaning of 
reproductive use to exclude the conditions for which PGD is 
licensed and applied. However, it is the process of PGD itself, 
and the characterisations and determinations of clinicians about 
the presence of particular genetic markers or abnormalities in 
the post-PGD embryo, which construct the resulting lack of 
suitability in the embryo. In doing so, PGD and those applying 
it redefine reproduction to exclude the affected embryo (Van 
Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). 
Legislating suitability: the unsuitable embryo in law 
The Patterson Act amends the RIHE Act, authorising modifi-
cations to the "proper consent" requirements for licenses to use 
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"unsuitable" embryos. The Act now defines "unsuitable for 
implantation, in relation to a human embryo" ins 7(1) in the fol-
lowing manner: 
(a) is diagnosed by preimplantation genetic diagnosis as 
unsuitable for implantation, in accordance with the 
Ethical Guidelines on the Use of Assisted Reproductive 
Technology in Clinical Practice and Research (2004), 
issued by the CEO of the NHMRC; or 
(b) is determined to be unsuitable for implantation in 
the body of a woman, in accordance with objective 
criteria specified in guidelines issued by the CEO of 
the NHMRC under the NHMRC Act 1992 and pres-
cribed by the regulations for the purposes of this 
paragraph. 
The amendment directly responds to the Review's recommen-
dations that ART embryos be deemed unsuitable according to 
"objective criteria", and through the use of PGD to detect 
"serious genetic defects" (Australian Government, 2005: xvi). 11 
The Lockhart Review distinguishes objective determinations of 
PGD from the subjective nature of determining "when the 
embryo appears less healthy" (Australian Government, 2005: 
17). The RIHE Act now legally sanctions PGD as an objective 
means of distinguishing the suitable embryo from the unsuit-
able (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). 
Both the Lockhart recommendations, and now the amended 
law, imply that "health" is understood as the absence of the 
genetic conditions identified by PGD (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk 
and Nisker, 2008). This assumption about "health" allows the 
Review to avoid debate on the limitations of the genetic deter-
minations of health (NECAHR, 2004: 14), as well as on the 
implications of PGD for people living with disabilities 
(NECAHR, 2004: 40, 61). Framing PGD as an "objective" way to 
determine "suitability", the Review fails to acknowledge and 
deal with the subjective factors that influence clinical decisions 
11 The NHMRC has issued guidelines on the "objective criteria" on 
which decisions about suitability for implantation are to be made 
based on morphologic characteristics. They can be found online at: 
<www .nhmrc.gov .au/embryos/stemcells/ _files/objective_criteria.pdf> 
(last accessed 23 June 2008). "Contextual Information" to these guide-
lines is available online at: <www.nhmrc.gov.au/embryos/stemcells 
/_files/contextual_info.pdf> (last accessed 23 June 2008). 
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about when PGD should be applied, and for what purposes 
(Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). The Review relies on 
the assumption that affected embryos would "never" (Austra-
lian Government, 2005: 120) be used for reproductive purposes 
to justify their availability to researchers. 
We suggest that, in light of the problematic nature of defi-
ning and describing "seriousness", "health" and "quality of life" 
with respect to genetic conditions, it is the application of PGD 
itself which produces the inevitability that embryos with 
particular genetic conditions will never be transferred to the 
woman, not the inherent or biomedical incompatibility of parti-
cular genetic characteristics with reproduction (Van Wagner, 
Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). The new law of Australia makes the 
practice of ART professionals in administering PGD the source 
of an "objective" (Australian Government, 2005: 169) assessment 
of suitability. Such determinations become the means through 
which "fresh" embryos are made available for "research, train-
ing and improvements in clinical practice" (Australian Govern-
ment, 2005: 169; Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). 
Section 24 of the RIHE Act sets out the licensing require-
ments for researchers to use excess ART embryos. The amended 
sub-s (8) states that a licence may provide for a modified 
application of the proper consent guidelines to the use of 
"unsuitable" embryos (s 8(a)). The amendment does not specifi-
cally remove the cooling-off period for post-PGD affected 
embryos, as recommended by the Lockhart Review; however, it 
includes the following note: "[f]or example, the guidelines could 
apply to a particular licence in a modified form, to alter the 
cooling-off period required in relation to the use of excess ART 
embryos that are unsuitable for implantation" (Patterson Act 
s 24(8)). 
Conclusion 
While much of the focus µi debates about research on in vitro 
embryos has centred on whether an embryo's moral status 
should be affected by the processes through which an embryo 
has been created and the intention behind that creation (CBS, 
2005a: 36), our analysis suggests another source of distinction is 
emerging through the use of PGD - one which determines moral 
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and ethical status on the basis of the embryo's genetic 
classification as "affected" or "unaffected" by genetic condi-
tions (Van Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). Driven by the 
need for sources of embryos, particularly "fresh" embryos, for 
research and training activities, assumptions about the objec-
tivity and the purposes of PGD are allowing clinicians, 
researchers and policy-makers to circumvent debates about the 
social dimensions of (re)defining reproduction to exclude a 
growing number of genetic characteristics and conditions (Van 
Wagner, Mykitiuk and Nisker, 2008). The consequences of this 
conceptual shift could be profound for people living with 
disabilities, their families and broader society. Scholars and 
policy-makers must expose assumptions behind notions of 
health, normalcy and reproductive choice, and must examine 
them to ensure that new practices and technologies benefit all 
women and their families, not just those who fit within the status 
quo. 
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